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Notes
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION v. TEXAS EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE FOUNDATION. IS THERE AN IOTA OF PROPERTY
INTEREST IN IOLTA?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers typically account for money received from clients in two
ways. 1 First, where lawyers receive client funds in large amounts which are
held for a sufficient length of time so that the funds produce income for
that client, the lawyer may be obligated to place the funds in an interestbearing account for the benefit of the client.2 Second, where lawyers re1. See Betsy BordenJohnson, Comment, "With Liberty andjusticeforAll"IOLTA
in Texas-The Texas Equal Access to JusticeSystem, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 725, 726 (1985)

("The money held in trust for clients can be divided into two classes.").
2. See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 675 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Ark. 1984) ("In
those cases in which these funds are more than nominal in amount or are to be
held for longer periods, the client may instruct the attorney to place the funds in
an interest-bearing account for the credit of the client."), modified, 738 S.W.2d 803
(Ark. 1987); In reNew Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1260 (N.H. 1982) (per
curiam) ("[L] awyers have a fiduciary obligation to place funds in an interest-bearing account and to credit the interest to the client when it is practical to do so.");
In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1983) ("Where
client funds are of sufficient amount or are held for a sufficient period that the
lawyer can ... foresee that they will yield enough interest to be of significant benefit to the client ... the lawyer will . . . be obligated to make the funds produce
income for ... the client.").

Investing clients' funds for the benefit of the client where there are positive
returns after accounting and banking charges is typically an ethical and fiduciary
duty of the attorney. See Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note, Florida'sIOLTA ProgramDoes
Not "Take" Client Propertyfor Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987), 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 369, 370 (1988)
(explaining traditional approach for attorneys handling large or long-term client
funds); see also Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 310-11 (Ct. App.)
(discussing State Bar of California guidelines for handling large or long-term client funds), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985). At the very least, upon receipt of
client funds, the American Bar Association states in Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B) of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other
properties. (2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client
promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other
place of safekeeping as soon as practicable. (3) Maintain complete
records of funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into
the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client
regarding them. (4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by
the client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of
the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY DR 9-102(B) (1980).

(189)
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ceive client funds which are nominal in amount or which are held for such
a short time period that it is impractical or impossible to produce income
for the client, the lawyer usually commingles the funds with other client
funds of the same type in a noninterest-bearing account.3 Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) is a program whereby the lawyer places this
second type of client funds together in an interest-bearing account to provide funding for legal services to indigent persons and other legally related public interest activities. 4 In light of recent federal and state cuts in
funding, IOLTA programs have become a critical source of funding for
legal services to the poor. 5
3. See New HampshireBar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1260 (stating earlier attorney practice of commingling nominal client funds or funds held for short period in noninterest-bearing accounts generated no income for clients and benefited only
banking institutions in which deposits were maintained); Interest on Lauyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d at 407 (describing attorney practice of pooling clients' funds
nominal in amount or expected to be held for short period of time prior to IOLTA
program); see also ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BOARD, INTEREST ON LAWYER
TRUST ACCOUNTS: REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GovERNORs 1 (1982) (reporting on
traditional attorney practice of commingling nominal and short-term client
funds).
The clients cannot collect the interest on these nominal and short-term accounts because separate accounts of the clients' funds would not yield enough
interest. Id. Further, it is either impractical or impossible to apportion individual
client interest from commingled funds because administrative costs would equal or
exceed any amount the client might earn in interest. Johnson, supra note 1, at
726. Finally, professional ethical rules prevent an attorney from collecting the interest from these commingled accounts. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982) (deciding it is ethically permissible

for lawyers to participate in IOLTA programs).
4. See Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Social Investing,IOLTA and the Law of Trusts: The
Settlor's Case Against the Political Use of Charitable Client Funds, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
163, 165 (1990) (describing TOLTA programs); Johnson, supranote 1, at 727 (discussing basic principles underlying IOLTA programs); Kreider, supra note 2, at
369 (explaining general concept of IOLTA programs).
In Texas, the program is called Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA).
Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 997
(5th Cir. 1996). Some jurisdictions refer to the program as Interest on Lawyers'
Accounts (IOLA) or Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA). See Risa I. Sackmary,
Note, IOLTA's Last Obstacle: Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar
Found. 's Faulty Analysis of Attorney's FirstAmendment Rights, 2J.L. & POL'Y 187, 187
n.* (1994) (referring to different names of IOLTA programs from state to state).
This Casenote uses the Texas terminology throughout.
5. See IOLTA Grants Update, IOLTA UPDATE 4 (ABA Comm'n on Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts, Chicago, Ill., Feb. 1996) (updating levels of funding to
legal services, as well as other services, through IOLTA programs). In 1994, 93%
of total national IOLTA grants went to legal services. Id. Thus, of the $91,567,846
total grants made by IOLTA in 1994, $85,048,631 went to legal services. Id. The
total percentage of IOLTA grants devoted to legal services by individual states
ranged from 55.7% to 100% in 1994. Id.
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created the Legal Services program to
give legal assistance to the poor. Carol Horowitz, Activism of Legal Services Corp. TaxFunded Group Tries to Expand Welfare State, INVESTOR'S Bus. J., July 24, 1995, at Al.
Legal Services remained under the now defunct Office of Economic Opportunity
for ten years. Id. Congress rechartered the program as a nonprofit corporation in
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IOLTA programs are created by the states. 6 All fifty states and the
District of Columbia now have IOLTA programs. 7 The Indiana Supreme
Court, which in the past refused to create an IOLTA program due to ethical and constitutional concerns, recently became the last jurisdiction to
adopt an IOLTA program. 8 In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1974. Id. Legal Services federal funding was $415 million for the 1995 fiscal year.
Id. Congress planned to slash Legal Service federal funding to $283 million for the
1997 fiscal year. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-863, at 3 (1996). These cuts came in
spite of the fact that the President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, James
Mundy, suggested that 80% of the poor's civil legal needs are now not being met.
Inside the Capitol HARRISBURG PATRIOT, July 19, 1996, at B4. Thus, for the past few
years, the IOLTA program has been an extremely valuable source of funding for
legal services which faced budget cuts in its federal funding from Congress. See
Paul Marcotte, Big Interest in Small Change, 73 A.B.A. J. 70, 71 (1987) ("When Congress cut millions of dollars from the Legal Services Corporation's budget, lawyers'
noninterest-bearing trust accounts were viewed as a potential supplemental source
for funding legal services for the poor and other projects.");Johnson, supranote 1,
at 729 n.19 ("Although IOLTA was originally conceived as a supplement to federal
support of legal services for the poor, recent budget cuts in the national legal
services program have forced IOLTA sponsors to look on it, at least in part, as a
private sector replacement for public funds slashed from the federal budget.");
Ron Devlin, Legal Services to Get FinancialBoost, ALLENTOwN MORNING CALL, Sept. 1,
1996, at B6 (predicting IOLTA funds may offset this year's federal cuts in Legal
Services funding). Most commentators agree, however, that IOLTA funding will
be insufficient to solve the funding crisis for Legal Services. See Johnson, supra
note 1, at 729 ("IOLTA does not guarantee 'justice for all,' but can only promise
justice for more."); Brian Cummings, As Funding Ebbs, Legal-Aid Providers Seek to
Reinvent Themselves, CHI. DAILY LEGAL BuLL., May 9, 1995, at 3 (noting many people
believe IOLTA grants and private donations are not enough to fill funding "void"
for legal services).
The various state bar associations who collect IOLTA funds put the funds remaining after Legal Services grants to a broad range of uses. See Marcotte, supra,at
71 (describing various states' other uses for IOLTA grants). Other general categories of grants listed by the American Bar Association Commission on IOLTA include administration of justice, public legal education, law student scholarships
and service activities, improving legal services, indigent defense and a category defined as "all other grants." IOLTA Grants Update, supra note 5, at 4. Specifically,
Maine allows attorneys to designate money for charitable organizations. Marcotte,
supra, at 71. North Carolina used funds to "enhance attorney grievance procedures." Id. Some states used IOLTA money to fund mediation projects and participate in the Bicentennial celebrations. Id. In California, one organization
financed with IOLTA income challenged a parental-consent abortion statute.
Rounds, supra note 4, at 165. Finally, in Massachusetts, an IOLTA recipient filed
legislative redistricting initiatives. Id.
6. See Rounds, supra note 4, at 173-74 (stating that IOLTA programs are "stateauthorized or state-mandated programs"); Sackmary, supra note 4, at 189 (discussing process by which jurisdictions permit IOLTA programs). Courts, legislatures
and attorneys have proposed IOLTA programs. Id.
7. HenryJ. Reske, FederalCourt to ConsiderIOLTA Challenge, 81 A.B.A.J. 32, 32
(1995) (discussing Washington Legal Foundation's arguments against IOLTA
programs).
8. See Indiana Committees Wrap Up Work, IOLTA UPDATE 4 (ABA Comm'n on
Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, Chicago, Ill., Aug. 1996) (reporting progress
of three committees to institute voluntary IOLTA program in Indiana). Recently,
the Indiana Supreme Court appointed a commission to evaluate the types of gov-
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just converted the Pennsylvania IOLTA program from a voluntary to a
mandatory program for all attorneys, thereby making it the twenty-sixth
9
state to have a mandatory IOLTA program.
ernance structures that other states use to run IOLTA programs and to draft an
IOLTA program. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court then established a second committee to draft a proposed rule to amend the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, forms and documents for an IOLTA program. Id.
For several years, Indiana remained the only state without an IOLTA program. In re Indiana State Bar Association's Petition, 550 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Ind.
1990) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). In 1990, the court rejected the institution of an
IOLTA program for the third time on two bases. Id. at 311. First, the court stated
that it was well-settled law that the interest which follows the principal belongs to
the client. Id. at 312. Second, the court noted ethical concerns about a lawyer who
commingles his or her clients' funds, which in the past had been a cause for disciplinary action against attorneys in the state. Id. Therefore, the court emphatically
pronounced: "[L ]et there be no cjuestion that the IOLTA program currently promoted by the Indiana Bar Association violates our Rules for the Discipline of Attorneys and Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. at 315.
ChiefJustice Shepard disagreed with the majority analysis. Id. at 316 (Shepard, CJ., dissenting). He stated that "[f]ifty state supreme courts have examined
the questions about which my colleagues write today and forty-nine of them have
reached the opposite conclusion.... [This] does not mean we are wrong, but it
certainly does not prove we are right." Id. (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Shepard reasoned that the other state supreme courts had already adequately
addressed the concerns which accompanied instituting an IOLTA program. Id.
(Shepard, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice's position prevailed when the Indiana Supreme Court agreed to an IOLTA program in 1995 and the Chief Justice
predicted that an IOLTA program would be up and running in one year to help
Indiana address the problem of "'more people knocking on the door of legal services than there are paid lawyers to help them."' Doug Sword, Indianato Join States
Using Interest Fundsfor Legal Aid to Poor, EVANSVILLE COURIER, Nov. 2, 1995, at 6A
(quoting Chief Justice Shepard) (discussing Chief Justice Shepard's opinions of
IOLTA programs).
9. PENNSYLVANIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.15(d)-(d)(1) (West
Supp. 1996). Rule 1.15 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct
provides:
(d) [A] lawyer shall place all funds of a client or of a third person in an
interest bearing account. All qualified funds received by the lawyer shall
be placed in an Interest On Lawyer Trust Account in a depository institution approved by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. All other funds of
a client or a third person received by the lawyer shall be placed in an
interest bearing account for the benefit of the client or third person or in
an other investment vehicle specifically agreed upon by the lawyer and
the client or third party.
(1) Qualified funds are monies received by a lawyer in a fiduciary capacity that, in the good faith judgment of the lawyer, are
nominal in amount or are reasonably expected to be held for
such a short period of time that sufficient interest income will
not be generated to justify the expense of administering a segregated account.
Id. The rule also provides that a lawyer may be granted an exemption by the
IOLTA board if: (1) the nature of the lawyer's practice does not necessitate routine maintenance of a trust account in Pennsylvania; (2) compliance would cause
undue hardship due to geographic locations of the lawyer or other compelling
factors; or (3) if service charges on the IOLTA account would "significantly and
routinely" outweigh any interest generated. Id. at Rule 1.15(e)(i)-(iii).
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Despite this high watermark and apparent universal approval for
IOLTA programs, several federal and state court challenges have been
brought against the programs. 10 The two earliest federal court challenges,
which claimed that IOLTA violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, were unsuccessful."
In the latest challenge,
There are three types of IOLTA programs: twenty-six states have mandatory
programs, twenty-one states operate under opt-out programs and three states remain voluntary. Wyoming Converts to Opt-out Status, IOLTA UPDATE 5 (ABA
Comm'n on Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, Chicago, Ill., Feb. 1996). Under
a mandatory program, "the state requires that all lawyers' trust funds earn interest
either for the client or the specified IOLTA organization." See Sackmary, supra
note 4, at 192 (comparing mandatory, opt-out and voluntary programs). In contrast, in a voluntary IOLTA program, an attorney may participate by notifying the
local bar foundation that an IOLTA account has been established with a financial
institution. Id. Finally, in an opt-out program, there is an annual opt-out period
where a lawyer must assert that he or she wants be excluded from the program. Id.
Many states converted to a mandatory program, or what is sometimes also
known as a comprehensive program, to generate a significant increase in IOLTA

funds. James F. Mundy, Legal Services to Get a Boost, HARRISBURG

PATRIOT,

Aug. 13,

1996, at A6. For example, in Pennsylvania, the conversion to a mandatory IOLTA
program is expected to generate $8 million for legal services each year as opposed
to the $2 million that had typically been accumulated annually under a voluntary
program. Id. Only one in four Pennsylvania attorneys participated when the program was voluntary in nature, but the mandatory or comprehensive status will affect approximately 30,000 lawyers who will now be required to set up IOLTA
accounts. Id. For this reason, many of the top ten IOLTA program revenue producers in 1993 were mandatory. See Reske, supranote 7, at 33 (listing top revenue
producers). The top ten state revenue producers in 1993 were: Florida, New York,
California, NewJersey, Massachusetts, Texas, Maryland, Connecticut, Georgia and
Illinois). Id. Moreover, the ABA House of Delegates overwhelmingly recommended in 1988 that all states having voluntary IOLTA programs switch to
mandatory IOLTA status. Supreme Court Opens Mandator-IOLTA Discussion, 19
MoNT. LAw. 15, 15 (1994).
10. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962,
968 (lst Cir. 1993) (upholding constitutionality of IOLTA program); Cone v. State
Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917
(1987); In reArkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Ark. 1984) (instituting IOLTA program), modified, 738 S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1987); Carroll v. State Bar
of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311-13 (Ct. App.) (upholding constitutionality of
IOLTA program), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981) (establishing IOLTA program and deciding no constitutionality concerns involved); In re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478
N.E.2d 715, 718, 720 (Mass. 1985) (holding IOLTA program as constitutional and
ethical); In re Petition of Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 152-53, 158
(Minn. 1982) (establishing IOLTA program and deciding that there were no constitutional concerns); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1260-61
(N.H. 1982) (per curiam) (holding IOLTA program constitutional); In re Interest
on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (establishing IOTA
program and deciding no constitutional issue existed).
11. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 968 (upholding constitutionality
of IOLTA programs over First and Fifth Amendment challenges); Cone, 819 F.2d at
1007 (upholding constitutionality of IOLTA program over Fifth Amendment
challenge).
Many state supreme courts addressed the constitutional issues of IOLTA programs when ordering implementation of a program in their respective states. See
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Washington Legal Foundationv. Texas EqualAccess to JusticeFoundation,'2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that clients have a
cognizable property interest in the interest generated under IOLTA programs for freedom of speech and "taking" purposes under the First and
13
Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
This Note discusses the Fifth Circuit's holding in light of other court
decisions upholding the constitutionality of IOLTA programs. 14 Part II
summarizes the history of IOLTA, the constitutional issues associated with

funds generated by IOLTA and the manner in which other courts have
treated these constitutional issues.1 5 Part III describes the IOLTA program in Texas and how the resulting challenge arose. 16 Next, Part IV
traces the Fifth Circuit's approach in finding a cognizable property interest in IOLTA funds. 17 Part V analyzes the conclusions of law of the Fifth
Circuit's decision. 18 Finally, Part VI focuses on the likely impact of the
Fifth Circuit's decision on IOLTA programs and on the relevant area of
constitutional "taking" law. 19
Sackmary, supranote 4, at 190 (noting that many states adopting IOLTA programs
first ratified programs as constitutionally and ethically permissible). Apart from
First and Fifth Amendment challenges, state court challenges to IOLTA programs
included claims: (1) that IOLTA denied Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (2)
that IOLTA was unconstitutionally vague in reference to funds that are nominal in
amount or held for a short period of time; and (3) that IOLTA violated equal
protection. Carroll, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 305. None of these claims were successful. Id.
This Note addresses only whether there is a cognizable property interest in the
IOLTA interest generated for First and Fifth Amendment federal constitutional
claims.
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No person shall be
...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
12. 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. Id. at 1004.
14. For a discussion of the court's decision in Washington Legal Foundation, see
infra notes 116-48 and accompanying text.

15. For a discussion of state implementation of IOLTA programs, First and
Fifth Amendment concerns with IOLTA programs, and other court decisions in
IOLTA constitutional challenges, see infra notes 20-99 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the initiation, history and data on the Texas IOLTA
program, see infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundation, see infra notes 116-48 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the conclusions of law reached
by the Fifth Circuit, see infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the consequences of the Fifth Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
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NOTE
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

History of IOLTA

Clients often entrust funds to a lawyer. 20 Before the adoption of
IOLTA programs, the general practice was for lawyers to place clients'
funds which were nominal in amount or which were to be held for a short
period of time in noninterest-bearing accounts. 2 1 The practice was premised on the notion that it was administratively and economically counterproductive to make these funds benefit the client. 22 IOLTA began with

the simple concept that while these accounts would generate no interest
separately, collectively the funds could generate significant sums.2 3 This
24
interest could then benefit certain identified charitable organizations.
20. See In re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 716 (Mass. 1985) ("'Attorneys have been entrusted with clients' funds and property since the early part of
the development of our common law system ofjurisprudence."' (quoting ArthurJ.
England, Jr. & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56
FLA. B.J. 101,101 (1982))); see also Rounds, supra note 4, at 173 (stating that clients
sometimes entrust lawyers with money); Johnson, supra note 1, at 726 (identifying
first step in examining IOLTA program as recognizing that lawyers often receive
money from clients or on behalf of clients).
The types of funds entrusted to a lawyer are varied. Kreider, supra note 2, at

370. Advanced funds for settlement drafts, court fees or miscellaneous expenses
are a few examples of the many types of funds typically received by an attorney. Id.
A lawyer may also temporarily hold a personal injury settlement or alimony payment for a client. Rounds, supra note 4, at 173.
21. See Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d at 716 (describing historical

method for dealing with nominal or short-period client funds in Massachusetts); In
re Petition of the Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Minn. 1982) (finding that in most Minnesota cases, nominal amounts of client funds or those held
for brief period are pooled in noninterest-bearing checking account); In re Interest
on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1983) ("Currently, [nominal
or short-period client] funds are usually pooled and held in noninterest-bearing
accounts since the separate balances do not yield enough interest to cover the

expense of computing, remitting, and reporting to the Internal Revenue Service
the amounts attributable to each client."); see also Rounds, supra note 4, at 173
(noting that nominal or short-period amounts were notable exception to general
rule requiring lawyers to invest funds for clients' benefit); Kreider, supranote 2, at
371 (stating that prior to IOLTA, lawyers frequently pooled nominal client
amounts in accounts bearing no interest); Sackmary, supra note 4, at 188-89 (noting practice of attorneys in handling nominal or short-period client funds prior to
IOLTA as simply "left with the bank").
22. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 370 ("The funds advanced by individual cli-

ents were typically nominal amounts or were held for such a short term as to preclude the practical possibility of earning interest, after accounting for costs.").
23. See, e.g., In reArkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ark. 1984)
(finding that only depository institutions benefited from accounts which hold
nominal or short-period funds of clients prior to IOLTA programs), modified, 738
S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1987). In accepting the petition to initiate an IOLTA program,
the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the "underlying concept of the IOLTA
program is that while the interest generated by each client's trust account funds is
too small to warrant payment to the client, the collective interest generated by the
lawyer's trust account as a whole may be substantial." Id.
24. Id. The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that this money "would be a very
significant source of income for the benefit of public interest programs related to
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Beginning in the 1960s, prior to initiation of IOLTA programs in the
United States, many foreign jurisdictions made use of interest on lawyers'
trust accounts to aid public service activities.2 5 Florida was the first state to
contemplate implementation of an IOLTA program and initiated a study
to consider the feasibility in 1971.26 After five years of research, the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court, requesting adoption of an
27
IOLTA program.
The federal banking regulations at the time of the Florida Bar petition prohibited interest-bearing checking accounts on a nationwide basis
and this served as a major impediment to implementation of an IOLTA
program.2 8 This obstacle was partially removed by the 1980 federal bankthe legal profession." Id. The main purpose of IOLTA is to shift an economic
benefit in the form of an interest-free loan to banking institutions to desperately
needed funding for a perceived worthwhile organization. Sackmary, supranote 4,
at 189. This perceived notion that banks received an enormous economic advantage from interest-free lawyer trust accounts persisted, despite the fact that many
banks waived administrative fees when holding accounts which were designated as
interest-free. Kreider, supra note 2, at 371.
25. SeeJohnson, supra note 1, at 730-31 (discussing programs created in Australia, Canada and parts of Africa); Sackmary, supra note 4, at 189 (noting that
several countries had IOLTA programs in place prior to United States). There
were twenty jurisdictions in five countries that had IOLTA programs in place
before any program was instituted in the United States. In re New Hampshire Bar
Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1259 (N.H. 1982) (per curiam) ("These jurisdictions include
ten Canadian Provinces and the Yukon and Northwest Territories, the Republic of
South Africa, Nambia, Zimbabwe and five States in Australia."); see also Arthur J.
England, Jr. & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56
FLA. B.J. 101, 102 (1982) (discussing IOLTA programs in foreign countries); F.
Gonser et al., FinancingPublic Services Activities with Interest-BearingAttorney Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHO L. REv. 219, 221 (1979) (same).
26. New HampshireBar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1259 ("The concept of interest-bearing-trust-account program in the United States apparently began in Florida in 1971
as a result of an investigation into means to provide funds for the improvement of
the administration ofjustice.").
27. Sackmary, supra note 4, at 190. The Board of Governors of the Florida
Bar, with the concurrence of the Board of Directors of the Florida Bar Association,
submitted the petition. New HampshireBar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1259. The Conference of ChiefJustices and the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association
endorsed the IOLTA concept. In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d
406, 406 (Utah 1983).
28. New HampshireBar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1259; Johnson, supra note 1, at 733.
There were two other major concerns that warrant discussion. The first was
the possible tax consequences of an IOLTA program for clients. Arkansas Bar Ass'n
Petition, 675 S.W.2d at 356. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) addressed this
concern before Florida became the first state to implement an IOLTA program.
Sackmary, supra note 4, at 190. The IRS ruled that interest income earned on
lawyers' trust accounts in an IOLTA program would not be taxable. New Hampshire
BarAss'n, 453 A.2d at 1259. The main reason for the ruling was that clients could
not control, consent or veto whether his or her funds would be part of an IOLTA
account. Arkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 675 S.W.2d at 356. Under the doctrine of
assignment of income, if a client consented to have his or her funds deposited in
an IOLTA account in ajurisdiction having a voluntary IOLTA program, the client
could be taxed on the income earned. Id.
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ing regulations, which allowed negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, or interest-bearing checking accounts. 2 9 The federal banking
regulations, however, prohibit the holding of interest-bearing checking accounts by for-profit businesses such as law firms.3 0 In a private letter ruling, the Federal Reserve System's general counsel stated31that Florida
attorneys could use NOW accounts for an IOLTA program.
When these initial banking concerns were lifted in 1981, the Florida
Supreme Court adopted the nation's first IOLTA program. 32 During the
1980s, with America's legal system for the poor in need of drastic help as a
backdrop, many states followed Florida's lead and initiated IOLTA programs. 33 Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted
IOLTA programs.3 4 By such action, state courts or legislatures have expressly or implicitly identified IOLTA programs as permissible on ethical
35
and constitutional grounds.
The second concern which was raised by opponents of implementation of
IOLTA programs was the ethical concerns for attorneys participating in IOLTA
programs. In re Petition of Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn.
1982). Formal Opinion 348 of the American Bar Association addressed these ethical implications for attorneys. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982). The Formal Opinion 348 stated that nothing in the
Code of Professional Responsibility would prohibit an attorney from participation
in an IOLTA program. Id. Specifically, the Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility found nothing that "prohibits a lawyer from participating in stateauthorized programs... which use interest earned on bank accounts in which are
deposited clients' funds, nominal in amount or to be held for short periods of
time, providing for the interest to be paid to certain tax-exempt organizations." Id.
29. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1994)) (permitting negotiable order of withdrawl (NOW)
accounts).
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2). The NOW account privilege applied:
(O]nly with respect to deposits or accounts which consist solely of funds
in which the entire beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals
or by an organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational, political, or other similar purposes and
which is not operated for profit.
Id.

31. Letter from Michael Bradfield to Donald M. Middlebrooks (Oct. 15,
1981), reprinted in Donald M. Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts ProgramMechanics of its Operation, 56 FLA. B.J. 115, 117 (1982). The letter stated that

"[s]ince no entity other than the Foundation has any interest to the income derived from funds maintained under the program, it would not appear that ...the
Foundation hold [sic] the entire beneficial interest to the funds." Id. Thus, the
letter concluded that the funds held under the proposed IOLTA program by law
firms would be eligible to be held in NOW accounts. Id.
32. Sackmary, supra note 4, at 190.
33. Id.

34. Sword, supra note 8, at 6A.
35. See Sackmary, supra note 4, at 190 (discussing manner in which states ratified IOLTA programs and found them "constitutionally and ethically permissible"). Most states, however, adopted IOLTA programs without opinion or through
legislation. Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94
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B. JudicialAuthority on PrNoperty Interest
In analyzing IOLTA challenges, many courts recognized that Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York%6 was a good summary of the
legal principles underlying the "taking" clause.3 7 In Penn Central,a zoning
law which was designed to protect the integrity of historical landmarks in
New York City prevented Penn Central from building an office tower
above its existing terminal.3 8 Penn Central filed a complaint which alleged that because of an unreasonable regulation, a temporary "taking" of
its property interest in the terminal had resulted.3 9 In an opinion by
Justice Brennan, however, the United States Supreme Court ruled
40
otherwise.
The Penn Central opinion had two significant effects in the area of
"taking" law. First, Penn Central established that to state a cognizable claim
of a "taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs must demonstrate as a threshold issue that they possess a recognized property interest
protected by the Fifth Amendment. 41 Second, Penn Central furnished a
F.3d 996, 1001 n.30 (5th Cir. 1996). Moreover, those state supreme courts which
had written opinions when implementing IOLTA programs turned to Florida's,
Minnesota's and New Hampshire's discussion of IOLTA programs in approving
the programs as ethically and constitutionally permissible. See Sackmary, supra
note 4, at 190 (stating that other jurisdictions followed Florida's lead in IOLTA
program implementation); see also In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672

P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (finding Florida's analysis with respect to lack of federal
constitutional impediment to IOLTA program as persuasive).
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 383 (stating that Penn Centralis generally rec-

ognized as good summary of "taking" clause law); Mary O'Bryne Sinibaldi, Note,
The Taking Issue in California's Legal Service Trust Account Program, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 463, 495-511 (1984) (discussing applicability of Penn Central to wide
range of "taking" cases and particularly to IOLTA California case); see also Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 973-74 (1st Cir.
1993) (using Penn Centralas summary of "taking" law and listing factors); Cone v.
State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002, 1005 (1lth Cir. 1987) (citing Penn Centralfor proposition
that claimant must have reasonable and investment-backed expectations rather
than inchoate unilateral expectations in property interest); Carroll v. State Bar,
213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311 (Ct. App.) (using Penn Central factors in IOLTA challenge),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
38. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,115,119 (1978).
39. Id. at 119.
40. Id. at 138.
41. Id. at 124-25. Prior to Penn Central the Supreme Court stated:

Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution [but
r]ather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). In Penn Central, Justice Brennan's opinion recognized that a "takings" claim may be dismissed if the interest

interfered with does not rise to the level of a property interest. Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124-25. In addition, the plaintiff in a "takings case" must point to credible
sources for their claimed property interest. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-
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multi-factor test for adjudicating "taking" cases in which a plaintiff has
demonstrated a recognized property interest: (1) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the char42
acter of the governmental action.
In Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith,43 arguably the most important authority in evaluating IOLTA "taking" challenges, the Supreme
Court used Penn Centralto determine whether a plaintiff had a recognized
property interest in the interest earned on an interpleader account.44 In
Webb's, a Florida statute provided that all interest earned on public or private monies deposited with a county circuit court registry became the
property of the clerk. 45 The appellant, Eckerd's of College Park, Inc.,
challenged the Florida statute on the ground that it was an unconstitutional "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 46 The Florida Supreme Court held that the Florida statute was
02 (1972). The Perry Court stated that credible sources included positive rules of
substantive law or mutually explicit understandings. Id.
42. Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124. The Penn Central Court concluded that

Penn Central was not deprived of property under this analysis. Id. at 138.

43. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
44. Id. at 161. The Court stated that "a mere unilateral expectation or an
abstract need is not a property interest entitled to protection." Id. (citing Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 122).
45. Id. at 156 n.1. The statute read in part:
Moneys deposited in the registry of the court shall be deposited in interest-bearing certificates at the discretion of the clerk .... All interest accruing from moneys deposited shall be deemed income of the office of
the clerk of the circuit court investing such moneys and shall be deposited in the same accounts as are other fees and commissions of the clerk's
office.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.33 (West 1977). In Webb's, Eckerd's of College Park, Inc. entered into an agreement to purchase all assets of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. for $1,812,145.77. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 156. At closing, however, it appeared as
though Webb's debts were greater than the purchase price. Id. Eckerd's filed a
complaint of interpleader in the Circuit Court of Seminole County, interpleaded
Webb's and its creditors, and tendered the purchase price to the court. Id. at 15657. Upon appointment of a receiver approximately one year after the tender of
the purchase price, the clerk returned the remaining principal minus a $9,288.74
statutory fee which was not contested. Id. at 158. The deduction of a clerk fee was
pursuant to the Florida Code. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 28.24(14) (West 1977) (authorizing clerk fee). The clerk, however, also deducted the interest earned on the
interpleader fund while held by the court, which amounted to over $90,000, pursuant to the Florida Code. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158. The appellants in this case alleged that the court acted sua sponte in appointing a receiver because the clerk
insisted that the county was entitled to the interest being earned on the interpleader fund and wanted to bring the controversy to an end. Id. at 158 n.4.
46. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158. The procedural history of Webb's was not entirely
clear. Id. at 159 n.5. The receiver moved that the circuit court direct the clerk to
pay the accumulated interest to the receiver. Id. at 158. The circuit court held
that "the clerk is not entitled to any interest earned." Id. Apparently, the federal
constitutional issues were not raised at the circuit court proceeding. Id. at 159 n.5.
The Seminole County clerk appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeals and
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constitutional because the private funds were considered public money
from the date of deposit until the date of return. 47 The Supreme Court
reversed and held that, in the narrow context where a state statute authorized the deposit of a private fund for interpleader protection, any appropriation of the interest earned on the fund while in the account
constituted a "taking" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
48
Amendments.
The Supreme Court established two principles in its decision. 4 9 First,
the Court determined that the interpleader fund was not public property,
but private property. 50 Second, and more importantly, the Court affirmed
the general rule that interest earned on a deposit of principal belongs to
the owner of the principal.51 The Court stated that Florida may not avoid
this well-established rule by simply redefining the principal as "public
52
money" while it was temporarily held by the court.
that court transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Florida. Id. at 158. While
it was unclear where the federal issues were first raised, the Supreme Court found
that the federal issues were satisfactorily addressed by the Florida Supreme Court
for review. Id. at 159 n.5.
47. Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). The court reasoned that "the statute takes only what it
creates." Id. at 953. Further, the court added that "[t]here is no unconstitutional
taking because interest earned on the clerk of the circuit court's registry account is
not private property." Id.
48. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164-65. The Supreme Court demonstrated the narrow
focus of its decision by holding that:
[U] nder the narrow circumstances of this case-where there is a separate
and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendereci"
based upon the amount of principal deposited; where the deposited fund
itself concededly is private; and where the deposit in the court's registry is
required by state statute in order for the depositor to avail itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors and others . . . the interest
earned on the interpleader fund while it was in the registry of the court
was a taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. The Court further narrowed its decision by stating that it offered no view as to
the constitutionality of a statute which allowed interest to be kept by a court as
return for the services rendered. Id. at 165.
49. Id. at 160-62.
50. Id. at 160-61. The Court found that the creditors had a state-created property right to their respective portions of the fund. Id. at 161. The Court conceded
that none of the creditors had rights to the fund until the court recognized their
claim. Id. The Court stated, however, that even though the creditors had no
immediate access to funds, this did not bar a property share in the interim. Id. at
162.
51. Id.; see also Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155, 1165 (5th Cir.
1976) (applying general rule that interest follows principal applied to interpleaded
funds); In re Brooks & Woodington, Inc., 505 F.2d 794, 799 (7th Cir. 1974) (same);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 463 (5th Cir. 1971)
(same); Board of Law Library Trustees v. Lowery, 154 P.2d 719, 719-20 (Cal. 1945)
(same); Kiernan v. Cleland, 273 P. 938, 938-40 (Idaho 1929) (same); McMillan v.
Robeson County, 137 S.E.2d 105, 108 (N.C. 1964) (same); Southern Or. Co. v.
Gage, 197 P. 276, 279 (Or. 1921) (same); Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242,
243 (Tex. 1972) (same).
52. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164. Specifically, the Court found that:
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C. IOLTA Challenges

In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Penn Centraland Webb's,
state supreme courts had to determine whether the Fifth Amendment impeded implementation of a state IOLTA program on the ground that it
was an unconstitutional "taking" of clients' property.53 One problem,
however, was that most states embraced IOLTA programs legislatively or
judicially without published opinions.5 4 Nevertheless, six state supreme
courts adopted IOLTA programs through published opinions. 55 Of these
six state supreme courts, five addressed the issue of whether there was a
constitutional property interest in the income attributed to the individual
56
client funds in IOLTA programs.
[A] State ... may not transform private property into public property
without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in
court [because] this [was] the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause
of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent [and the] Clause stands as
a shield against the arbitrary use of [this type of] government[ ] power.
Id.
53. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 376 (noting that Webb's was "ingredient" to
Florida's adoption of IOLTA program). The Fifth Amendment applies against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
54. Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to justice Found., 94 F.3d
996, 1001 n.30 (5th Cir. 1996).
55. See In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n Petition, 675 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ark. 1984)
(authorizing inception of IOLTA program), modified, 738 S.W.2d 803 (Ark. 1987);
In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 393-94 (Fla. 1981) (same); In re
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 716 (Mass. 1985) (same); In re Petition of
Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. 1982) (same); In reNew Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (N.H. 1982) (same); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 407 (Utah 1983) (same).
The Florida Supreme Court was the first state supreme court to address implementation of an IOLTA program. Kreider, supra note 2, at 372. As the first court
to consider an IOLTA program and its consequences in the United States, the
court faced many problematic issues. Id. The courts and legislatures adopting
IOLTA programs often accepted the analysis of the Florida Supreme Court in
resolving banking, tax, ethical and constitutional concerns in implementing the
Florida IOLTA program. Id. Many of these courts relied on the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in instituting IOLTA programs in their state without comment.
Id.
Until recently, Indiana remained the only state to publish an opinion refusing
to implement an IOLTA program. See In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition, 550
N.E.2d 311, 316 (Ind. 1990) (refusing inception of Indiana IOLTA program). Indiana has since initiated a process of implementing an IOLTA program. See
Sword, supra note 8, at 6A. For a discussion of Indiana's past refusal to initiate an
IOLTA program, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. See Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 395-96 (resolving Fifth Amendment "taking" concern with respect to proposed IOLTA program); Massachusetts
BarAss'n, 478 N.E.2d at 717-18 (same); Petition of Minn. State BarAss'n, 332 N.W.2d
at 158 (same); New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1260-61 (same); Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d at 408 (same).
Interestingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address constitutional concerns, but did address tax concerns with IOLTA programs. See Arkansas Bar Ass'n,
675 S.W.2d at 357 (holding that interest earned on IOLTA program would not be
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In In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 57 the Florida Supreme Court was the
first court to address constitutional concerns raised by Webb's and Penn
CentraL58 The court modified earlier proposals and finally authorized implementation of an IOLTA program. 59 Initially, the court agreed that the
Supreme Court's decision in Webb's was a new factor to consider. 60 The
court, however, disagreed with the contention that the Webb's decision
61
barred implementation of an IOLTA program.
The court pointed to two distinguishing aspects between the proposed IOLTA program and the situation which called for the Supreme
Court to invoke the "takings" clause in Webb's.62 First, the court found the
main distinction was that there was no "property" to "take" from clients
because the income created by the proposed IOLTA program could not
benefit the client under any circumstances. 63 Second, the court noted
taxable to clients). The other five state supreme courts addressed tax concerns as
well. See Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 390-91 (determining that tax issue
was not concern to implementation of IOLTA program); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n,

478 N.E.2d at 719 (same); Petition of the Minn. State BarAss'n, 332 N.W.2d at 158 n.2

(same); New Hampshire BarAss'n, 453 A.2d at 1260 (same); Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d at 406 (same). In addition, all six state supreme courts discussed ethical concerns with instituting an IOLTA program. See ArkansasBarAss'n,
675 S.W.2d at 356-57 (deciding that participation in IOLTA program by attorney
was ethically permissible given American Bar Association opinion); Interest on Trust
Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 396 (same); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d at 718-19
(same); Petition of the Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d at 158 (same); New HampshireBar Ass'n, 453 A.2d at 1261 (same); Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d
at 406-07 (same). For a discussion of tax and ethical issues as initial concerns of

state courts, see supra note 28.
57. 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
58. Id. at 393. The court acknowledged that "a new consideration which affects the program in light of the Foundation's request that we make it . . .
mandatory is the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in [Webb's]." Id.
59. Id. at 389.
60. Id. at 393.
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id. The court stated:
There are many distinguishing features between the program today implemented for the generation of interest on lawyers' trust accounts, and
the legal requirements of state law which led the United States Supreme
Court to invoke the [F]ifth [A]mendment "taking" clause for the protection of private property in its Webb's decision.
Id. The court, however, only discussed two distinctions which were described as
the "most relevant distinction" and "another vast difference" between the property
in the proposed IOLTA program and the property in Webb's. Id. at 395-96.
63. Id. at 395. The court specifically found that "no client is compelled to
part with 'property' by reason of a state directive, since the program creates income where there had been none before, and the income thus created would
never benefit the client under any set of circumstances." Id.
The dissent stated that "[t]he majority's answer to the 'taking' argument [was]
inadequate." Id. at 399 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Justice Boyd stated that there was an
inconsistency in the majority's argument. Id. (Boyd, J., dissenting). The inconsistency was the majority's view that IOLTA created an income or benefit when there
was none before, yet, when nominal or short-term client funds were held in noninterest-bearing accounts, the majority identified the beneficiary as the financial in-
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that contrary to the situation in Webb's, the proposed IOLTA program was
voluntary in nature. 6 4 The five subsequent state supreme court opinions
agreed with the Florida Supreme Court's view that there was no client
"property' to "take" and consequently approved IOLTA programs despite
65
the Webb's decision.
Moreover, in Carroll v. State Bar of California,66 the California Court of

Appeals upheld the constitutionality of that state's IOLTA program in the
only state court IOLTA challenge. 6 7 In Carroll, the state bar appealed
from the lower court's holding that the California IOLTA program was a
voluntary program. 68 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of California reversed and found that the program was mandatory for attorneys. 6 9 The court also determined that the IOLTA program did not cause
a "taking" and considered other constitutional claims not adjudicated by
70
the trial court.
Interestingly, the Carrollcourt turned to the issue of whether there
was a "taking" without first considering whether IOLTA interest was client
stitutions. Id. (Boyd, J., dissenting). One commentator suggested that Justice
Boyd foresaw the "crux" of the issue as well as a possible future challenge by a
client who has deposits in IOLTA. Kreider, supra note 2, at 378.
64. Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d at 396. The court determined that a
client's acquiescence to the IOLTA program undermined any serious "taking"
claim. Id. One commentator suggested that this was a "shortsighted assumption"
by the court. Kreider, supra note 2, at 378 n.51.
65. See In re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 717-18 (Mass. 1985)
("We follow the weight of authority in concluding that interest on nominal or
short-term trust deposits is not property for constitutional purposes .... [and] ...
agree with the Florida court's analysis and conclude that there is no constitutional
impediment to the IOLTA proposal."); In re Petition of the Minn. State Bar Ass'n,
332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982) ("We do not find that under the circumstances
here the client has any 'property' that is being taken without compensation or
without due process of law under... the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution .

.

. [because t]here simply is no 'property' now in existence that would be

taken."); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.H. 1982) (per
curiam) ("We agree with the Florida court's analysis and find no constitutional
impediment to the interest-bearing-account proposal."); In re Interest on Lawyers'
Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) ("For the reasons adequately explained in the Florida, Minnesota, and New Hampshire opinions .

.

. we see no

federal or state constitutional impediment to the [IOLTA] program as proposed
in the petition and as elaborated in this opinion.").
66. 213 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985). The Carroll
court was not faced with a decision to implement an IOLTA program, but rather a
state court challenge to an already existing California IOLTA program. Id. at 307.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id. For a discussion of the differences between a mandatory and voluntary
program, see supra note 9.
70. Carroll, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 307. In addition to holding that the IOLTA program did not involve a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment, the court
also held that the IOLTA program: (1) did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause; (2) was not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) did not deny Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. These issues are not addressed in this Note. For a
discussion of the Carrolldecision, see Sinibaldi, supra note 37, at 486-88.
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money, satisfying the threshold issue of a recognized property interest
under Penn Central.7' In analyzing the "takings" claim, the Carroll court
determined that reliance on Webb's was misplaced. 72 First, the court noted
the facts were distinguishable because the sum deposited in Webb's was
neither nominal in amount, nor to be held for a short period. 73 Moreover, the court determined that if it were to void the IOLTA program on
the constitutional ground of an unlawful "taking," the client would not be
financially enhanced because the administrative costs would negate any
"economic advantage." 74 Finally, the Carroll court stated that even if a
"taking" occurred, the action was constitutionally permissible under the
Penn Centralfactors because it was a minimal and nonphysical regulatory
invasion and the public good was served greatly by the IOLTA program. 75
Likewise, in Cone v. State Bar of florida,7 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that there was no unconstitutional
"taking" of a client's residuary amount of a cost deposit with a law firm
used in the Florida IOLTA program. 77 Unlike the court in Carro4 the
Cone court first considered the threshold issue established in Penn Central
of whether the client had any recognized property interest. 78 The court
71. Carroll, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12. The court, however, addressed the issue
in the context of the consequences of voiding the IOLTA program. Id. at 312.
72. Id. ("Respondents mistakenly rely on ...[Webb's] to bolster their claims of
Fifth Amendment violations.").
73. Id.

74. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "[p ractically speaking, should the
court void [the IOLTA program] on.constitutional grounds, the clients would not
be enhanced economically [as t]heir deposited funds would not be returned nor
would they obtain any economic advantage." Id.
75. Id. The court stated:
Further, when the regulation is one which promotes the common good,
even by adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life, a compensable "taking" is less readily found than where there is a physical government invasion. Where the public good is great, and a "taking" is minimal,
it is permissible. Even a substantial property interest may be taken
through zoning laws, etc.

Id. (citation omitted).
76. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 1003-04. The client and appellant in Cone was Evelyn Glaeser. Id. at
1003. Evelyn Glaeser passed away and Jean Cone, the personal representative of
Evelyn Glaeser, replaced her as appellant. Id. at 1004 n.1. In 1969, Evelyn Glaeser
aid a $100 cost deposit to the law firm of Holland & Knight to probate the will of
er late husband. Id. at 1003. Of the $100, $13.75 mistakenly remained in the
trust account until 1981 when the firm transferred the amount, along with other
nominal client amounts, into interest-bearing accounts pursuant to Florida's
IOLTA program. Id. at 1003-04. Evelyn Glaeser's $13.75, combined with other
nominal or short-term clients amounts, generated $2.25 of interest given to the
Florida Bar Foundation. Id. at 1004. The court found that Evelyn Glaeser's funds
could not have generated income without IOLTA due to economic realities of
such a nominal amount. Id. This $2.25 amount of interest led to a $20 million
lawsuit. See Marcotte, supra note 5, at 70 (discussing facts of Cone).
78. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. The court stated that "[t]he district court correctly perceived that the appellant's constitutional claims turned on one question,
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affirmed the district court's finding that the threshold requirement was
not met because the appellant failed to assert any protected property interest in the income earned on the nominal remaining cost deposit when
combined with other nominal amounts. 79 Thus, the court evaded discuss80
ing whether a governmental "taking" occurred.
There were two noteworthy aspects of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion
in Cone.8 ' First, the court noted that IOLTA funds were an exception to
the traditional property rule that "'the interest goes with the principal, as
the fruit with the tree."' 8 2 The court stated that this traditional doctrine,
which the Supreme Court followed in Webb's, assumed that there was a
"fruit-bearing tree" in existence.8 3 Thus, as her deposit could not generate interest on its own, the court reasoned that the "taking" claim failed
because the client had not asserted a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
84
interest allegedly "taken" from her.
that being, whether the interest earned on nominal or short term funds held in an
IOLTA account was the property of the client for the purposes of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. The other claims in Cone were that: (1) the IOLTA
program deprived property without due process and (2) deprivation of her property was a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. Id. A recognized property
interest in IOLTA income earned on clients' deposits appears to be a threshold
issue for First Amendment claims as well. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 973 n.8 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We address the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim first ... in order to resolve the plaintiffs' property
rights to funds deposited in IOLTA accounts before discussing the First Amendment claim which also involves that issue.") For a discussion of whether IOLTA
violates clients' or attorneys' First Amendment right not to speak, see Sackmary,
supra note 4, at 197-212.
79. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. The court held:
In affirming the district court, we emphasize that we are not establishing
a de minimis standard for Fifth Amendment takings, or due process violations. We do not wish to imply that the state may constitutionally appropriate property so long as the property is very small property. Here, there
was no taking of any property of the plaintiff.
Id. at 1007. The court further stated that the deposit could not generate interest
by itself. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that by combining nominal and shortterm accounts, the IOLTA program "created [interest] which was not within the
legitimate expectations of the owner of any one of the principal amounts." Id.
80. Id. at 1004. For a discussion of a federal circuit's rejection of a "taking"
claim against an IOLTA program based on the Penn Centralfactors, see infra notes
92-94 and accompanying text.
81. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004, 1007.
82. See id. (quoting Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 319 (1809)); see
also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980) ("The
usual and general rule is that any interest on ... [a] deposited fund follows the
principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that
principal.") (citation omitted).
83. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004. The court concluded that "[Evelyn] Glaeser's
money would not have borne any fruit, for her benefit or for anyone else's." Id.
84. Id. ("Thus, it could not be said that she had a legitimate claim of entitlement to the interest which she claimed was taken from her without due process or
just compensation.").
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The second noteworthy aspect of Cone was the court's treatment of
the Webb's decision in a manner similar to that of other courts which had
addressed IOLTA challenges. 8 5 Like the court in Carroll, the Cone court
found that the facts at bar had only "superficial similarity" to the facts in
Webb S.8 6 The court noted that the interpleaded funds in Webb's gave rise
to a legitimate claim of entitlement because the funds were sufficient in
amount and held for a longer period of time. 8 7 The court determined
that this was not the case in Cone because the funds generated no net
value, and therefore, failed to create a legitimate expectation of interest

88
over and above the administrative costs.
Finally, in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Founda-

tion,89 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied an
action brought by Massachusetts lawyers and citizens which claimed that
the Massachusetts IOLTA program violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. 90 The plaintiffs in this case, however, claimed a constitu85. Id. at 1007.
86. Id.; see also Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 312 (Ct. App.)
(distinguishing Webb's on ground that it "does not address issues pertinent to this

case"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985).
87. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007; see also In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d

389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981) (distinguishing Webb's on basis that IOLTA program does
not "take" client property); In re Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 718
(Mass. 1985) (distinguishing Webb's on basis that interest involved in IOLTA programs is not property); In re Petition of Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151,
152-53, 158 (Minn. 1982) (finding no "property" in existence with IOLTA programs but not in reference to Webb's); In re New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d
1258, 1260-61 (N.H. 1982) (per curiam) (agreeing with opinion of Florida
Supreme Court in analysis of Webb's); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (agreeing with analysis of Florida and New Hampshire courts with respect to concerns raised by Webb's).
88. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004.
89. 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
90. Id. In Massachusetts BarFoundation, the plaintiffs also included the Washington Legal Foundation, a nonprofit, public interest law and policy center. Id. at
969. In addition, two attorneys brought action on behalf of themselves and their
clients. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs also included two citizens of Massachusetts. Id.
One citizen-plaintiff expected to use attorneys in the future and one used attorneys in the state in the past, and thus, her money had been subjected to an IOLTA
deposit. Id. Presumably, the diversity of the parties was an attempt to address any
standing concerns. See id. Indeed, the First Circuit determined only one citizen
and one attorney had standing. Id. at 972. The defendants were the Massachusetts
Bar Foundation, Boston Bar Foundation, the Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation, the chair of the Massachusetts IOLTA committee, the chair of the Board
of Bar Overseers and the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Id. at 969.
In this case, the attorneys-plaintiffs alleged they were forced, to their financial
detriment, to avoid participating in the IOLTA program by setting up their clients'
deposits in noninterest-bearing accounts. Id. at 970. The attorneys-plaintiffs also
alleged they were forced to choose between not practicing law or supporting
groups that offended their political beliefs. Id. The citizens-plaintiffs alleged they
were forced to support groups with which they disagree when employing attorneys
in Massachusetts. Id.
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tional interest not in the income earned, but in the right to control and
91
exclude others from the use of those funds.
The First Circuit held that the IOLTA program was not an unconstitutional "taking" on two grounds. 92 First, the court concluded that there
was no recognized property interest in excluding others from the beneficial use of deposited funds. 93 The court found no authority that recognized a constitutionally protected property right to control others' use of
94
intangible property.
Second, even though the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the threshold showing of a recognized property interest required under Penn Central,
the court still rejected the appellants' "taking" claim on the basis of the
Penn Centralfactors establishing whether a "taking" is constitutionally permissible. 9 5 Citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cone, the First Circuit
distinguished the Webb's decision in its analysis of one of the Penn Central
factors.9 6 The court agreed that there were "superficial similarities" beThus, the plaintiffs argued the IOLTA program violated their First and Fifth
Amendment rights. Id. The plaintiffs requested that the court: (1) require appellees to refund the interest earned on their funds; (2) declare the IOLTA rule void
as unconstitutional; (3) issue permanent injunctions prohibiting the requirement
that the attorney comply with IOLTA; (4) issue a permanent injunction directing
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to require attorneys to disclose the
uses of IOLTA funds to their clients; and (5) reasonable attorney fees to appellants. Id. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 971.
91. Id. at 973. The court stated that this may have been in response to the
many courts which held that there was no constitutionally protected property right
in interest earned on IOLTA accounts. Id.
92. Id. at 974.
93. Id. The plaintiffs relied on trust law to establish a protected property interest in the right to control the beneficial use of their funds. Id. The court was
"not convinced that the deposit of clients' funds into IOLTA accounts transforms a
lawyer's fiduciary obligation to clients into a formal trust with the reserved right by
the client to control the beneficial use of the funds as claimed by the plaintiffs."

Id.
94. Id. The court stated that "[t]he plaintiffs have cited no sources which
recognize a similar constitutionally protected property right to control or exclude
others from intangible property and we have found none." Id.
95. Id. To address the Penn Central factors, the court assumed that the appellants established a claimed property interest. Id. The court then used the Penn
Centralfactors to analyze the "taking" claim. Id. With respect to the physical invasion factor, the court held that the property rights claimed were intangible because the clients' funds were left untouched by the IOLTA program. Id. at 976.
Next, the court decided that there was no economic interference because the appellants had no economic benefit derived from the right to control or exclude the
use of the funds. Id. The court concluded that no "taking" occurred and that they

need not weigh any burden caused by "taking" private rights against public benefit.
Id.
96. Id. at 975-76. Again, the court stated that the plaintiffs recognized that

clients have no right to interest earned on IOLTA accounts and thus claimed only
a right to exclude others from using the benefits of their deposits. Id. at 976.
Thus, the court further distinguished Webb's because that case involved tangible
property interests and the plaintiffs claimed only intangible property interests. Id.
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tween the statutory fee in Webb's and the Massachusetts IOLTA program. 9 7
Distinguishing Webb's on the ground that the interest earned on IOLTA
funds was not the property of the plaintiffs, the court concluded that there
was no legal support for finding that the IOLTA program caused a physical invasion of their property rights. 98 The courts addressing IOLTA challenges consistently concluded that the interest accumulated by IOLTA
programs was not the property of the clients, that is, until the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
99
Foundation.
III.

FACTS: WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDA TION V. TXAS EQUAL AccEss TO
JUSTICE FOUNDATION

In 1984, the Texas Supreme Court initiated a voluntary IOLTA program which was modeled after IOLTA programs in other states. 100 The
Texas IOLTA program permitted attorneys to place client funds that were
nominal in amount or reasonably believed to be held for a short period of
time into a nonsegregated interest-bearing account.1 0 1 The interest on
the account was to be paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF), a nonprofit corporation created by the Texas Supreme
Court.' 0 2 TEAJF distributed the interest earned from IOLTA accounts to
97. Id. at 975.
98. Id. at 976 ("We find no logical or legal support for the plaintiffs' claim
that the IOLTA program has caused a physical invasion and occupation of their
intangible property rights.").
99. 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 998. In 1984, the Texas IOLTA program was voluntary in that
attorneys chose whether or not to participate with or without the consent of their
clients. Id. For a discussion of voluntary, opt-out and mandatory IOLTA programs, see supra note 9. The Texas Supreme Court granted a court order in establishing the IOLTA program. See TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 320a-1, § 4(a) (West
1973) (granting authority to "[t]he Texas Supreme Court [to] prepare and propose rules and regulations for.., the operation, maintenance, and conduct of the
State Bar.").
In December 1981, the State Bar of Texas created a special committee to investigate the feasibility of an IOLTA program. Johnson, supra note 1, at 736.
Upon the committee's recommendation that an IOLTA program was in order, the
state bar drafted legislation for a mandatory program. Id. The bill passed the
Texas Senate in the 1983 session, but the House rejected the bill on the basis that
it would cause class action suits against agencies of the government. Id. The state
bar, sensing the state legal services' immediate need for funding, petitioned the
Texas Supreme Court for a voluntary program instead of waiting until the 1985
legislative session to submit another IOLTA bill. Id. at 737.
101. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998. Attorneys were to make a reasonable determination whether a client's funds were nominal in amount or only
held for a short period. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11,
§§ 6-7 (West 1987) (determining which client funds were appropriate for IOLTA
deposit). If this determination was made in good faith, the attorney could not be
held liable for his or her decision. Id. § 7.
102. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998. A state bar commission drafted
the rules, articles of incorporation and bylaws of the Texas Equal Access to Justice
Foundation ("TEAJF"). Johnson, supra note 1, at 737. In December 1984, the
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209

nonprofit organizations that "have as a primary purpose the delivery of
10 3
legal services to low income persons."
The Texas IOLTA program initially generated only $1 million per
year. 10 4 In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court followed the lead of other
states and made attorney participation in the program mandatory.10 5
Under the mandatory Texas IOLTA program, the earnings increased to
approximately $10 million per year. 10 6 TEAJF continued to disperse the
income earned on IOLTA accounts to nonprofit organizations who ap10 7
plied for funding.
The plaintiffs brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
Texas's IOLTA program in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 10 8 The plaintiffs included: a nonprofit public interest law and policy center called the Washington Legal Foundation, a Texas
attorney who regularly placed clients' funds in an IOLTA account and a
Texas citizen who had funds held in an IOLTA account. 10 9 The plaintiffs
alleged that the Texas IOLTA program violated the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution because it was an impermissible "taking" of clients' property and violated the First Amendment because it forced them to support
speech that they found offensive. 110 The plaintiffs requested compensation for the interest earned on their funds in the IOLTA accounts and an
Texas Supreme Court implemented the program. Id. at 738. The Foundation was
incorporated on January 11, 1985. Id.
103. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998 (citing TEx. R. OF CT. 10). The
rules, however, provided that TEAJF may provide funds "to finance suits against
governmental entities on behalf of individuals in order to secure entitlement to
benefits." TEX. R. OF CT. 15.
104. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998.
105. Id. The new Texas IOLTA Rule provides:
An attorney.., receiving in the course of the practice of law... client
funds that are nominal in amount or are reasonably anticipated to be
held for a short period of time, shall establish and maintain a separate
interest-bearing demand account at a financial institution and shall deposit in the account all those client funds.
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11, § 5 (West Supp. 1997). Rule
6 of the Texas Rules of Court on the Rules Governing the Operation of the Texas
Equal Access to Justice Program further clarifies that client funds should only be
deposited in IOLTA accounts if such funds "could not reasonably be expected to
earn interest for the client." TEX. R. OF CT. 6. In addition, the attorney should not
deposit funds in IOLTA accounts "if the interest which might be earned ... is not
likely to be sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and maintaining the account,
service charges, accounting costs and tax reporting costs which would be incurred
in attempting to obtain interest on such funds for the client." Id.
106. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 999. In 1993, Texas was the sixth
highest IOLTA program revenue producer. See Reske, supra note 7, at 33 (listing
top ten IOLTA revenue producing states).
107. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 999.
108. Id. at 998.
109. Id. at 999 n.10.
110. Id. at 999.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 189

injunction prohibiting further application of the Texas IOLTA
111
program.
The defendants in this case, including TEAJF, the director of TEAJF
and all of the justices of the Texas Supreme Court, moved for summary
judgment. 112 The district court granted the defendants' motion. 113 The
district court found the reasoning of the First Circuit in Massachusetts Bar
Foundationand the Eleventh Circuit in Cone "compelling" and determined
that there was no property interest at stake in the proceeds earned on
funds deposited in the Texas IOLTA program.1 14 The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that the plaintiffs had a recognized property interest in the interest proceeds earned on funds deposited
in IOLTA accounts for purposes of the First and Fifth Amendments of the
Constitution.'1 15
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In reversing the district court's decision that clients have no protected
interest in IOLTA-generated proceeds, the Fifth Circuit first noted the
suggestion that the Texas IOLTA program was a "modern-day attempt at
alchemy."' 1 6 The court was of the opinion that, just as the alchemists
failed to turn ordinary metal into gold, the IOLTA program in this case
failed to make "something from nothing."' 17 The IOLTA program failed
because the claimed "nothing" was actually the fruits of the clients' deposits, and therefore, "something" for constitutional purposes.1 18
The Fifth Circuit determined that state law defined "property."'11 9
The court then stated that Texas followed the traditional property doc111. Id.
112. Id. at 999 & n.11.

113. Id. at 999. The defendants first motioned to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. Id. This motion was denied by the district court. Id. The plaintiffs also

filed for summary judgment which the district court denied when granting defendants' summary judgment motion. Id.
114. Id. at 999-1000; see Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar
Found., 993 F.2d 962, 980 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding constitutionality of Massachusetts IOLTA program); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir.
1987) (upholding constitutionality of Florida IOLTA program). For a discussion
of these cases, see supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
115. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004.
116. Id. at 1000. "While legends abound concerning the ancient, self-professed alchemists who worked tirelessly towards their goal of changing ordinary
metal into precious gold, modern society generally scoffs at this attempt to create
'something from nothing."' Id. The court stated that the defendants believed
they "unlocked the magic that eluded the alchemists." Id. The ingredients were
the combination of client funds and modern banking anomalies. Id.
117. Id. The court viewed "the IOLTA interest proceeds not as the fruit of
alchemy, but as the fruit of the clients' principal deposits." Id.
118. Id.

119. Id.; see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (declaring
state law was one source of property interests).
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trine that interest follows the principal.1 20 Thus, simply put, the interest
12 1
earned on IOLTA accounts belonged to the clients.
The court further concluded that finding a recognized property interest in the IOLTA income generated by clients' deposits gave proper
weight to Supreme Court precedent in Webb's v. Fabulous Pharmacies,

Inc.122 The court found the Supreme Court's holding in Webb's to be helpful to an IOLTA constitutionality analysis. 123 In addition, the court deter1 24
mined that the facts in Webb's were similar to those in the case at hand.
Therefore, the court reasoned that just as the creditors had a property
right in the interest earned on the interpleader fund in Webb's, so should
the clients have a property right in the interest their deposits generated
for IOLTA.1 25 Given the similarities between Webb's and the case at bar,
the court applied the traditional property doctrine that interest follows
principal and held that the clients had a recognized property interest for
constitutional purposes in the income generated for Texas's IOLTA
26
program.1
120. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1000; see Sellers v. Harris County, 483
S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972) (holding that interest on funds, held in trust pending
litigation, accrued to owner of principal).
121. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1000. The Fifth Circuit, discussing
the traditional doctrine that interest follows principal, reasoned that "[i] n the light
of this rule, it seems obvious that the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts is the
property of the clients whose money is held in those accounts." Id. The court
believed the analyses of the First and Eleventh Circuits "circumvents this rule." Id.
122. Id.; see Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 16465 (1980) (holding that interest on client interpleader principal went to owners of
principal). For a discussion of Webb's, see supra notes 43-52 and accompanying
text.
The Fifth Circuit summarized the district court's opinion, stating that "the
plaintiffs cannot 'have a [cognizable] property interest in interest proceeds that,
but for the IOLTA Program, would have never been generated."' Washington Legal
Found., 94 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access
to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 7 (W.D. Tex. 1995), affd in part, vacated in part
and rev'd in part, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996)). The Fifth Circuit, however, found
that the district court's decision did "not give proper weight to Supreme Court
precedent." Id. Because the district court adopted the views of the First and Eleventh Circuits, the court implied their analyses of the "taking" claims with respect to
IOLTA programs also did not give proper weight to Supreme Court precedent. See
id. (stating that district court, following theory of First and Eleventh Circuits, circumvented traditional property rule relied upon by Supreme Court).
123. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1000. Specifically, what the court
found helpful was that interest earned on a state held interpleader principal was
private property and could not be claimed by the state. Id. at 1001.
124. Id. at 1000 ("In [Webb's], the Supreme Court addressed a similar
situation.").
125. Id. at 1002 ("We see no reason why [the Webb's] rule does not apply to

the instant case.").
126. Id. at 1003. The court stated that "[t]he Texas IOLTA program, however, requires attorneys to place certain client funds into an IOLTA account and
then takes the interest that accrues for itself ... [and] the plain rule is that the
interest proceeds, once they have accrued, belong to the owner of the principal."
Id.
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Furthermore, the court bolstered its reasoning by finding that the
many courts that were at odds with its decision, and in particular the Eleventh Circuit in Cone v. State Bar of Florida,127 used a shortsighted definition
of "property."128 The court stated that the Cone court redefined "property" as "'an interest that must necessarily benefit its owner."' 129 The
court determined that this was an insufficient definition of "property for
two reasons."'13 0 First, according to the Fifth Circuit, the Webb's decision
instituted a rule that a property interest existed in accrued interest independent from the value of the interest in dispute.' 31 Thus, the court
reasoned that the Eleventh Circuit's observation that administrative costs
associated with an IOLTA account may not allow a client to net any value
did not mean that no property interest existed; rather, the court found no
reason why the Webb's rule should not apply because a property interest
existed "because '[t]he earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of
32
the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property." 1
Second, the Fifth Circuit determined that the Cone court's definition
of "property"-that there must be a net value before a property interest
exists-did not consider the two-step process of interest and principal in a
banking transaction. l3 3 The first step was that interest accrued on the
clients' principal.' 3 4 The second step was that the bank deducted its
charges from the depositor's account.13 5 The Fifth Circuit emphasized
that the property interest attached after the first step or when the interest
accrued. 13 6 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that the Cone court and its
127. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987). For a discussion of the Cone decision,
see supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
128. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002. The court found that the Cone
court erroneously defined "property." Id.

129. Id. (quoting Sinibaldi, supra note 37, at 492).
130. Id. at 1002-03.
131. Id. at 1002 ("The Webb's decision, however, creates a rule that is independent of the amount or value of interest at issue.").
132. Id. (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,

164 (1980)).
133. Id. at 1002-03. The court stated that "[t] he Cone court also failed to consider the precise events of the transaction, concluding that the only protectable
property interest in interest proceeds attaches to the amount of interest that remains after a bank deducts its charges from the interest earned, because the owner

of the principal only has a legitimate expectation of receiving those interest proceeds." Id. "It appears, however, that a bank pays interest on the account and then
deducts fees. It is a two-part process." Id. at 1003. The court found that banks first
"pay' interest and then deduct administrative costs. Id. Presumably, the court
meant that the bank credits accounts and then subtracts any banking charges. See
id. (stating that interest accrues before bank deducts its charges from depositor's
account).

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. Because the interest accrued first in the two-step process, the court
determined that "[a]s a result, a property interest attaches the moment that the
interest accrues." Id.
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progeny were determining property interest too late, namely, after the sec13 7
ond step, when there was no net value left.
The court also found that this erroneous "net-value" definition of
property helped the Cone court distinguish the facts of the Supreme
Court's decision in Webb's from the situation concerning the constitutionality of IOLTA programs. 13 8 The court stated that the Eleventh Circuit's
decision to distinguish Webb's hinged on the basis that the interest appropriated from the interpleader fund in Webb's clearly exceeded any fees assessed.13 9 Thus, the Cone court avoided applying the traditional property
doctrine in Webb's because the Florida IOLTA program appropriated only
interest from deposits which could not benefit the client in excess of administrative costs. 140 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Cone court ignored Webb's initial holding, which stated that4 a property interest existed
in accrued interest independent of its value.1 1
Finally, the court refused to declare that IOLTA interest was not property because it feared encouraging government agencies to find other possible sources of "unclaimed" interest. 142 The court pointed to the interest
137. Id. at 1001-02 ("The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Webb's on the basis
that Webb's involved the ownership of over $100,000 in accrued interest, an amount
that clearly exceeded any fees that were assessed.").
138. Id. at 1002.
139. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "[a]ccording to the Eleventh Circuit, the use of the money had no net value because the IOLTA program only
takes the interest from those deposits that do not produce interest in excess of the
administrative expenses incurred." Id.
140. Id. The court also stated that in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachu-

setts BarFoundation,993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir. 1993), the First Circuit came to the
same erroneous conclusion. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002 n.35. The
Fifth Circuit believed, however, that the First Circuit's opinion in this regard was
dicta because the plaintiffs in that case did not assert property rights in the IOLTA
interest proceeds. Id. In that case, the plaintiffs only sought to protect their right
to exclude the state from using their principal. Id. For a further discussion of the
First Circuit's opinion, see supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
141. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002-03. The court also rejected the
defendant's argument that Webb's was distinguishable because the interest in this
case could never accrue. Id. at 1003. The court found that "[t]his argument ignores one of the critical driving forces of IOLTA: IOLTA programs became possible only with the announcement of [the] Internal Revenue Service." Id. The
announcement of the IRS was that as long as clients had no choice but to participate in IOLTA programs, they would not be taxed on the interest earned. Id.
Thus, the court rejected the defendant's argument that interest could never ac-

crue by noting that the IRS would consider the interest as taxable income of the
clients if the clients had any control over the interest. Id. The court acknowledged
that the tax liability was not present here because Texas had an IOLTA monopoly
depriving the clients of any right of control. Id. Nevertheless, if the clients had

any control, the clients would have to pay taxes on the interest earned, but would
not have a property interest for constitutional purposes within the Cone definition
of "property." Id. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant's argument
"[flew] in the face of reason." Id.
142. Id. The court described the situation as "incit[ing] a new gold rush" if it
found no property interest in IOLTA proceeds. Id. For this reason, the court was
"hesitant" to rule for the defendants. Id.
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not credited to depositors by banks during the "float time" of checks as a
possible source of government agency appropriation.1 43 The court also
discussed technology as a source of banking anomalies that could create
interest belonging to no one, and therefore, could be appropriated by the
states.1 44 These concerns made the court "hesitant" to find that clients
had no constitutional property interest in the interest earned on their
145
deposits.
In light of its decision that the plaintiffs had a valid property interest,
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of the "takings" claim.1 46 The court noted that the plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the "taking" was against the will of the property
owner. 147 The court stated that a similar showing of compelled speech
148
was necessary for plaintiffs to prevail on the First Amendment claim.
143. Id. at 1003-04. The court stated that it usually takes one to two days
before a check is cleared with the Federal Reserve Bank in the simple case. Id. at
1004. Thus, the depositary bank will receive a provisional credit during this process or, in other words, an interest-free loan similar to the situation in IOLTA
programs. Id.
144. Id. The court stated that "[a]s technology continues to advance, the

speed with which such transactions can occur will continue to increase, providing
greater opportunities for states to try to collect the fractions of pennies that could
be earned as interest during the float time of all these activities." Id. Regardless of
these increased opportunities created by technology, the court noted that the
traditional property doctrine, that any accrued interest belongs to the owner of the
principal, still applied. Id.
The court also rejected the argument made by one commentator that technology may change what constitutes property for constitutional purposes. Id. at 1004
n.47; see also Kreider, supra note 2, at 391-93 (arguing that change in technology
could affect what constitutes protected property interest). Specifically, the court
rejected this argument because any change in the cost to banks to manage small
deposits "would impact the determination of whether a property right in IOLTA
interest exists." Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004 n.47. The court viewed
this argument as a "short-sighted view of property [that] renders it unacceptable"
and instead instituted a bright line rule for property interest in IOLTA programs
by rejecting this line of reasoning. Id.
145. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1003.
146. Id. at 1004.
147. Id.; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25

(1978) (establishing factors to determine constitutionally impermissible "takings"
claim). For a discussion of how other courts applied the Penn Central factors to
IOLTA challenges, see supra notes 71-75, 95-98 and accompanying text.
148. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004. ("[A] similar showing would
also likely be necessary to prevail on their First Amendment claim."). For a discussion of whether IOLTA programs violate the First Amendment, see Sackmary,
supra note 4, at 197-211.

The court also addressed the defendant's claim that they were immune under
the Eleventh Amendment with respect to plaintiffs' claim for monetary restitution.

Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1005. The Fifth Circuit held that the district
court correctly granted immunity to the defendants with respect to these claims.
Id.
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CaRncAL ANALYSIS

The Fifth Circuit only addressed the threshold issue of whether there
was a constitutionally recognized property interest in the income earned
by clients' principals deposited in IOLTA accounts. 14 9 The court correctly
determined that this issue must be resolved before an IOLTA program can
be held to violate the First and Fifth Amendments.1 50 The Fifth Circuit,
however, incorrectly found a constitutional property interest in the interest generated by clients' funds in IOLTA accounts.
A.

The Webb's Decision and the TraditionalProperty Doctrine that Interest
Follows the Principal
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly relied on Webb's to assert that clients had

a property interest in income accrued from their principal deposited in
IOLTA accounts; the court extended the Webb's decision too far by holding that it created a rule that constitutional property interests attached to
interest on the principal, regardless of the value or amount of the inter52
est.' 5 ' The Supreme Court decided Webb's on very narrow grounds.'
The Webb's decision held only that states may not recharacterize an interpleader fund in order to take the interest earned.1 53 IOLTA programs,
149. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004 (remanding case to trial
court to address whether plaintiffs established Penn Central factors after holding
that property interest in IOLTA interest proceeds existed).
150. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (recognizing
that plaintiffs must assert cognizable property interest to raise Fifth Amendment
takings claim); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161
(1980) (stating that "a mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a
property interest entitled to protection"); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (finding
that government must interfere with interests that are bound up with reasonable
expectations of plaintiff asserting "taking").
With respect to the First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs in this case argued
that a mandatory IOLTA program forced them to financially support speech activities of those who received IOLTA funds. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 999.
Thus, the plaintiffs had to be successful in arguing that they had a property right
in the interest generated by their deposits in IOLTA programs before they could
argue they were compelled to financially support certain "offensive" organizations.
See id. at 1004 (rejecting district court's premise that clients have no valid property
interest in IOLTA proceeds and remanding case for determination on First and
Fifth Amendment claims).
151. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1000 (relying on Webb's). For a
discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of Webb's to the facts of Texas's IOLTA
program, see supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
152. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002 (determining that "[t]he
Webb's decision, however, creates a rule that is independent of the amount or value
of interest at issue").
153. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164-65 (holding "under the narrow circumstances
of this case ... [that] the interest earned on the interpleader fund while it was in
the registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). The Court found that "a State ... may not transform private property
into public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the
deposit in court." Id. at 164.
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however, do not recharacterize either the principal deposit of clients or
the resulting interest earned on the principal. 154 In contrast, IOLTA pro1 55
grams create interest where there was none before.
Both the First Circuit in MassachusettsBarFoundationand the Eleventh

Circuit in Cone seized upon this point and correctly distinguished the
Webb's decision, stating that the interest should follow the interpleaded
principal, as contingent upon a principal capable of bearing any interest.1 56 Thus, the Webb's decision, as well as the traditional property doctrine that the interest should follow the principal, applied only when there
was an expectation that interest could follow the principal.' 57 If deposited
separately rather than pooled, the funds used for Texas's IOLTA program
could not, under any set of circumstances, generate interest.1 58 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied the principles expounded in
Webb's and the traditional property doctrine that interest follows principal.
154. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 387-88 (finding Florida's IOLTA program
created interest instead of "taking" previously existing interest).
155. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998 (acknowledging IOLTA programs created with idea that client funds to be used were too small to generate
interest in excess of costs); Cone v. State Bar of Fla., 819 F.2d 1002, 1004 (11th Cir.
1987) (finding that "[o]nly deposits which could otherwise not earn interest ...
could be used to generate interest under the [IOLTA] program").
156. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962,
975-76 (1st Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Webb's because "[t]he Webb's claimants had
property rights to accrued interest which is tangible personal property" and stating
that "[iun this case, the plaintiffs do not have a property right to the interest
earned on their funds held in IOLTA accounts"); Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006-07 (concluding that Webb's decision was distinguishable because there was no property for
state to appropriate); see also Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 312
(Ct. App.) (finding that "Webb's does not address issues pertinent to this case"),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985); In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389,
395-96 (Fla. 1981) (stating that there were many distinguishing features between
facts surrounding implemented Florida IOLTA program and facts in Webb's); In re
Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Mass. 1985) (disagreeing that Webb's
decision supported proposition that IOLTA interest was property); In re Petition of
the Minn. State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Minn. 1982) (stating that IOLTA
raised no constitutional Fifth Amendment claim without reference to Webb's); In re
New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 453 A.2d 1258, 1261 (N.H. 1982) (per curiam) (finding
Webb's decision inapplicable because no client would be unjustly compelled to part
with interest under proposed IOLTA program); In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust
Accounts, 672 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) (adopting reasons explained in Florida,
Minnesota and New Hampshire decisions that IOLTA programs implicated no
Fifth Amendment concerns).
157. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (stating claim must go beyond "mere unilateral expectation" to be considered constitutionally protected interest); Cone, 819
F.2d at 1004 (stating IOLTA program was exception to traditional property doctrine that interest follows principal).
158. See TEx. R. OF CT. 6 (describing type of clients' funds suitable for IOLTA
deposit). The Texas IOLTA rules provide that the only client funds suitable for
deposit in IOLTA accounts are those which reasonably could not earn interest for
the client or those which would not earn interest in excess of the costs associated
with interest-bearing accounts. Id.
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B.

The Two-Step Process

The court's analysis with respect to the two-step banking process
failed to consider the nature of attorneys' accounts prior to implementation of IOLTA programs. 15 9 Prior to IOLTA, the general practice was for
attorneys to place nominal or short-term client funds in a commingled,
16 1
noninterest-bearing account. 16 0 Indeed, this was the practice in Texas.
Moreover, the court's two-step analysis was flawed because banks typically
62
waived any fees in exchange for the interest-free use of attorney funds.'
159. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1003 (describing two-step banking
process with attorneys' trust accounts). For a discussion of the court's analysis of

how the two-step banking process gave rise to property interest in IOLTA income,
see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.,
160. See MassachusettsBarFound., 993 F.2d at 968 ("Traditionally, in Massachusetts and in other states, clients' funds which lawyers held for a short term or in
nominal amounts were deposited into non-interest bearing pooled trust accounts."); Cone, 819 F.2d at 1005 ("Before the initiation of the [IOLTA], the only
beneficiaries of the old regime were the banks, who were treated to 'free' use of
trust account deposits."); Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts, 672 P.2d at 407 ("Cur-

rently, [IOLTA-qualified] funds are usually pooled and held in noninterest-bearing accounts ....); MassachusettsBar Ass'n, 478 N.E.2d at 716 ("Historically, client
funds small in amount 'have been commingled and placed in noninterest-bearing
accounts held in trust for the individual clients."' (quoting Mark F. Wolfe, Special
Project, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts: A Proposalfor Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REv.
835, 835 (1983))); Petitionof Minn. State BarFound., 332 N.W.2d at 155-56 ("Tradi-

tionally, [IOLTA qualified] funds have been held in trust by lawyers in a noninterest bearing checking account."); see also Rounds, supra note 4, at 173 (stating that
"generally accepted practice in the United States allowed lawyers to deposit
[IOLTA] funds in bank accounts bearing no interest"); Johnson, supra note 1, at
726 (noting client funds which would qualify for then proposed IOLTA program
have been "traditionally commingled with other client funds of the same class and

deposited in non-interest-bearing bank accounts").
161. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9102 (1984). The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility provided three universal principles. Id. First, attorneys aggregated nominal or short-term funds into
trust accounts held in their law firms' names, rather than being deposited on an
individual client basis. Id. Second, clients did not earn income on these funds
deposited with their attorneys because they were held in noninterest-bearing accounts. Id. Third, the rules prohibited attorneys from benefiting from their cli-

ents' trust accounts. Id.
162. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 371 ("[Dlepository institutions that held
these attorney trust accounts essentially had free use of the funds, after the usual
service charges, costs a bank waives when it can use funds without paying
interest.").

While clients and attorneys may not have a viable constitutional interest to
challenge IOLTA programs, this Note does not address whether banks may have a
legitimate claim because they no longer are able to have interest-free use of funds
that now fall under state LOLTA programs. One commentator noted, however,
that banks generally have accepted IOLTA programs for two reasons. SeeJohnson,
supra note 1, at 727 (describing IOLTA shift of economic benefit from banks to

nonprofit organizations). First, while banks clearly now receive less benefit under

IOLTA programs, banks still received some benefit from IOLTA programs because
they utilize the funds at a higher rate of return than the interest paid to nonprofit
organizations. Id. Second, because of modern economics and the competition
between financial institutions, lawyers will move clients' funds to a bank providing
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Thus, while the court characterized the pre-IOLTA attorney practice
concerning nominal or short-term client funds as a two-step banking process, it was really a one-step process of placing the clients' funds in a noninterest-bearing account with no banking fees. 16 3 A recognized property
interest sufficient to sustain a constitutional challenge could not possibly
attach at any stage because the interest was never generated in the first
place, and consequently, the clients had no reasonable expectation to
earn such interest. 16 4 The court, therefore, improperly used the two-step
banking process as a reason to justify the conclusion that a property interest attached to interest earned on clients' funds in an IOLTA program.
C.

Unclaimed "Floating"Interest

The court correctly reasoned that various governmental agencies
might seek other unclaimed floating interest to use in an IOLTA-type program if they found no property interest in IOLTA funds for constitutional
purposes. 165 This point, however, did not properly address whether there
was in fact a constitutionally protected interest in IOLTA-generated interest. 16 6 Rather, the court's analysis was dicta concerning an issue outside
IOLTA services. Id. The financial institutions' general acceptance of IOLTA programs suggests that few banks may be willing to constitutionally challenge the programs if they indeed had a viable claim. See id. (stating financial institutions
accepted IOLTA programs).
163. See Kreider, supra note 2, at 371 (stating that attorneys pooled clients'
funds in noninterest-bearing demand or transaction accounts with banks waiving
associated costs).
164. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)
(stating plaintiff asserting deprivation must demonstrate government interfered
with "interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations"
of plaintiff). Thus, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's opinion, clients had no reasonable expectation to earn interest even for the simple purpose of paying for the
administrative costs to maintain these accounts. See id. (stating that even though
government action may cause harm, plaintiff can not prevail without showing constitutionally protected interest). With no reasonable expectations to earn interest,
the clients failed to establish the threshold issue of a constitutionally protected
interest. Id.
165. SeeWashington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to justice Found., 94
F.3d 996, 1003-04 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing examples in banking anomalies that government agencies could appropriate in future). For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's hesitancy to declare no property interest in IOLTA interest for fear of state
appropriation of other unclaimed "floating" interest, see supra notes 142-45 and
accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice
Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 4 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (warning that commendable goals
of IOLTA were not reason to uphold constitutionality of program), affd in part,
vacated in part and rev'd in part, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court

noted that the goals of the Texas IOLTA program were "laudable." Id. The court,

however, stated it was "conscious ofJustice Holmes' warning that '[a] strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."' Id.
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)) (alteration in
original). Along the same line of reasoning, the Fifth Circuit should not find a
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the scope of analysis with respect to whether IOLTA funds involved a con167
stitutionally protected interest.
VI.

IMPACT

Under a proper analysis of constitutionally recognized property interest, the Fifth Circuit should have held that the Texas IOLTA program did
not violate the First or Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution because there was no threshold showing that the clients had a recognized property interest in IOLTA-generated interest. 168 The court should
have found the Supreme Court's decision in Webb's to be distinguishable. 1 69 Moreover, in light of the noninterest-bearing nature of commingled client nominal and short-term funds prior to IOLTA, the court
1 70
should have concluded there was no client property to take.
Instead, the court's decision in Washington Legal Foundationwill have
implications that reach beyond an incorrect application of constitutional
law. Given that IOLTA programs are present in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia, the court's decision in this case will no doubt give
rise to a large number of other constitutional challenges to IOLTA programs in otherjurisdictions.1 71 Many of these challenges will undoubtedly
72
rely on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundation.'
protected property interest because not doing so would create potential for
greater appropriation by states, even though such appropriations would be constitutionally permissible.
167. Arguably, the court might have been addressing the first Penn Central
factor, the economic impact of the state action, that defines an impermissible "taking" under the Constitution. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (holding that
plaintiffs must establish both recognized property interest and that such interest
was impermissibly taken according to three factors to sustain cause of action for
"taking" under Fifth Amendment). The problem was, however, that the court remanded the case to the lower court in order to determine whether there was a
"taking" under Penn Central Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004. Therefore,
any consideration by the court on this issue was dicta.

168. For a discussion of the threshold showing necessary under Penn Central
to sustain a Fifth Amendment "taking" cause of action, see supra notes 3642 and
accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of Webb's, see supra

notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's application of the two-step banking
process, see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
171. See Michael A. Riccardi, Fifth Circuit Causes Split on IOLTA Validity, LEGAL
Sept. 24, 1996, at 1 (comparing Fifth Circuit's opinion to those of
other circuits). Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, Richard A.
Samp, stated that several lawyers contacted him about the possibility of mounting
challenges in other states. Id. Pennsylvania is not one of the states that currently
has a challenge in progress. See id. (stating that "[n]o Pennsylvania [c]ase [i]s on
INTELLIGENCER,

[the] [h]orizon").
172. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Washington Legal Foundation, see supranotes 116-48. One commentator suggested, however, that courts
faced with an IOLTA constitutional challenge should address the Penn Centralfactors in addition to the threshold issue of whether IOLTA involved a protected
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The increased number of challenges to IOLTA programs, however,
will not be the only impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision. In addition, the
court's decision will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of existing IOLTA programs in generating funds for legal services to the
poor.1 73 Attorneys in states with opt-out or voluntary IOLTA programs
will be hesitant to place client funds in IOLTA accounts for fear of litigation or uncertainty. 174 Moreover, the current trend of states switching
from voluntary or opt-out to mandatory IOLTA status may quickly subside. 175 Thus, IOLTA program revenue could drop significantly, causing
major distress for legal services to the poor-services which are already
impaired financially due to cuts in their public funding. 176 As described
by one attorney in the area of legal services, the result will be that needy
177
clients will be "beating down our doors" in order to get legal services.
Ultimately, this case or one of its progeny may come before the
Supreme Court for review. 17 8 The Court will weigh the arguments made
by the First and Eleventh Circuits, as well as other state courts which hold
that clients have no property to "take" in IOLTA programs, against those
property interest. See Amy L. Mauk, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Massachusetts
IOLTA Program's CharitableAssignment of Accrued Interest Not Taking in Violation of
Fifth Amendment, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 807, 814 (1994) (criticizing First Circuit
because court failed to consider state interest advanced in IOLTA programs,
thereby passing opportunity to reject on those grounds as well). The argument
would be that the Fifth Circuit could have avoided extensive litigation of the constitutionality of IOLTA if the court upheld the program based on the Penn Central
factors. See id. (using same argument in critiquing First Circuit's analysis). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for more factual determinations by the
district court on this issue. Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1004.
Both the First Circuit and the California Court of Appeals found that IOLTA
programs do not impermissibly take clients' property under the Penn Central factors. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding that IOLTA program's use of clients' funds was not govemmental physical invasion); Carroll v. State Bar of Cal., 213 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311-14
(Ct. App.) (applying Penn Centralfactors in upholding Fifth Amendment challenge
to IOLTA program), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985). For a discussion of these
cases, see supra notes 66-75, 89-99 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the importance of IOLTA funds to legal services to
the poor, see supra note 5.
174. For a discussion of mandatory, voluntary and opt-out IOLTA programs,
see supra note 9.
175. For a discussion of the trend of states to switch to mandatory IOLTA
programs in order to generate increased revenue, see supra note 9.
176. For a discussion of the importance of IOLTA revenue for legal services
due to cuts in funding by the federal government, see supra note 5.
177. See Cummings, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that IOLTA revenue will not be
enough to fill void of traditional sources of funding). Admittedly, however, the
effect of the Fifth Circuit's decision on the poor is not a reason to hold that clients
have no property interest in the interest generated by their IOLTA accounts.
178. See Riccardi, supra note 171, at 29 (noting that IOLTA issue is likely to go
to Supreme Court for review). If the Fifth Circuit's opinion is to be reviewed by

the Supreme Court, however, the district court will have to conclude its remand
proceedings. Id.
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arguments made to the contrary by the Fifth Circuit. 179 In view of the
incorrect application of Supreme Court precedent by the Fifth Circuit in
Washington Legal Foundation, the Court should distinguish its decision in
Webb's from the interest on IOLTA accounts and unequivocally uphold the
constitutionality of IOLTA programs.
Brennanj Torregrossa
179. For a discussion of the Eleventh, First and Fifth Circuit's opinions re-

garding a recognized property interest in IOLTA funds, see supra notes 76-88, 8998, 116-48 and accompanying text.
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